Earnings of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. and its consolidated subsidiaries for the third quarter and nine months ended September 30, 2001 and 2000 are summarized below. Amounts are stated on an after-tax basis (dollar amounts are in millions, except per share amounts).

Third Quarter      

First Nine Months   






Earnings (loss) from operations
    before purchase-accounting-adjustments





  Purchase-accounting adjustments





Earnings (loss) from operations





Realized investment gain





Net earnings (loss)





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Average Class A equivalent shares outstanding






Earnings (loss) per share:


  Earnings (loss) from operations



$ (52)

$ 591 

  Net earnings (loss)





  ====  ===  ===  ==== 


Warren E. Buffett, Berkshire’s Chairman and CEO, has written a letter to Berkshire’s shareholders discussing Berkshire’s third quarter results. The letter, which has been posted on Berkshire’s website, is reproduced below.

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway:

Normally I write you just once a year. However, results of the third quarter, as summarized above, are anything but normal and I would like to elaborate a bit on what took place.

We initially reported an estimate of $2.2 billion for our pre-tax insurance loss from the terrorist attack of September 11th. We labeled that amount a "guess" and the earnings reported above include a charge of $2.275 billion from the attack. This revised number remains a guess: Important questions of liability will likely remain unresolved for years. Consequently, neither we nor other industry participants can be reasonably precise now as to final losses. We estimate that about $1.7 billion of our loss occurred at General Re and $.575 billion at Berkshire Hathaway’s Reinsurance Group.

A mega-catastrophe is no surprise: One will occur from time to time, and this will not be our last. We did not, however, price for manmade mega-cats, and we were foolish in not doing so. In effect, we, and the rest of the industry, included coverage for terrorist acts in policies covering other risks ¾  and received no additional premium for doing so. That was a huge mistake and one that I myself allowed.

There are three basic rules in running an insurance company:

  1. Only accept risks you are able to properly evaluate (stay within your circle of competence) and confine your underwriting to business that, after an evaluation of all relevant factors, including remote loss scenarios, carries the expectancy of profit (though obviously every policy we issue carries with it a risk of loss, often significant);

  2. Limit the business accepted in a manner that guarantees you will suffer no aggregation of losses from a single event or from related events that will threaten your solvency; and

  3. Avoid business involving moral risk: No matter what the rate, you can’t write good contracts with bad people. While most policyholders and clients are honorable and ethical, doing business with the few exceptions is usually expensive.

Unfortunately, during the past three years all of those rules were broken at General Re, although, luckily, the consequences on September 11th from breaking the second rule were far from lethal. We are as strong as any insurer in the world and our losses from the attack, though punishing to current earnings, are not significant in relation to Berkshire’s intrinsic business value.

However, as an example, had the attack in New York been nuclear, it is likely that most of the U.S. insurance industry, as well as reinsurers worldwide, would have been destroyed. Such an act could have caused $1 trillion or more of insured damage, a sum that far exceeds the aggregate capital of the world’s insurance companies. There is no company or group of companies that has the resources to assume such a risk, even though all concerned have unthinkingly been doing so. The only viable reinsurer for truly large-scale terrorism is the U.S. Government.

At Berkshire we will never knowingly write policies containing promises we can’t keep. Indeed, we don’t want to write an accumulation of policies or coverages exposing us to a "worst case" loss that would leave us uncomfortable. If we have been paid appropriately for assuming the risk, we don’t mind losing $2 billion. But we don’t want to lose $20 billion, even though we could handle that.

Therefore, General Re is revamping its underwriting practices and discipline with a new urgency ¾  to insure that all three tests described earlier are met. Management recognizes that such discipline is needed immediately and Joe Brandon, the company’s new CEO, and Tad Montross, its new President, are working nights and weekends. Their job is made doubly tough because interest rates have fallen, reducing the value of float and making breakeven underwriting unattractive. But Joe and Tad ¾  along with a host of talented professionals who are responding to their leadership ¾  will get the job done, have no doubt about that.

However ¾  and this is important ¾  most insurance contracts run for a year. General Re, like other major insurers, has considerable "mid-course" business on its books that exposes it to acts of massive destruction by terrorists. This business is indeed running off. But in the meantime we continue to bear huge quantities of risk for which we received no payment.

Here’s an update on our other operations:

Additional information about the quarter can be found in our Third Quarter Interim Shareholder Report, posted on the Berkshire Hathaway website.


Warren E. Buffett



Berkshire’s third quarter interim report to shareholders will be posted on the Internet later today at approximately 6:00 p.m. central time where it can be accessed via

Berkshire Hathaway and its subsidiaries engage in a number of diverse business activities among which the most important is the property and casualty insurance business conducted on both a direct and reinsurance basis. Common stock of the Company is listed on the New York Stock Exchange, trading symbols BRK.A and BRK.B.

Certain statements contained in this press release are "forward looking" statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Act of 1995. These statements are not guaranties of future performance and actual results may differ materially from those forecasted.

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